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Case No. 20100246-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
vs.

Patricia Salazar Houston,
Defendant/ Appellee.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State appeals from a pretrial order of dismissal entered following the
suppression of all of the State's evidence. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008), and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(b)
(West Supp. 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the State's evidence,
finding no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of Defendant's car.
Issue 1. Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal of the
subsequent pre-trial order of dismissal without prejudice, which order fails to
expressly provide that the prosecution's case was substantially impaired by the
suppression of evidence?

Standard of Review. "Whether this court has jurisdiction presents a question of
law that we review for correctness." State v. Cashing, 2004 UT App 73, f 10,88 P.3d
368; see also Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, Tf 8,31 P.3d 1147.
Issue 2. Did the trial court err in ruling that the stop of Defendant was not
supported by a reasonable suspicion that she was driving on a suspended or
revoked license?
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. Morris, 2009 UT App 181,
f 5,214 P.3d 883. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially
for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. See State
v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, \ 8,147 P.3d 425; State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f f 11,15,103
P.3d 699; Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, If 5,177 P.3d 655. The underlying
factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 11,
100 P.3d 1222; Bench, 2008 UT App 30,1 5.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions and cases are relevant to a
determination of this appeal and are attached in Addendum A:
U.S. Const. Amend. IV;
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (West Supp. 2009).

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 8,2008, Deputy Avery Stewart was investigating a retail theft
claim at a Macey's store in Providence, Utah, when he stopped to talk with off-duty
Trooper Phil Rawlinson outside the store's entrance. R. 142:13, 22. During their
conversation, Trooper Ralinson saw Defendant driving an automobile out of the
parking lot. R. 142:12-14.
Trooper Rawlinson recognized Defendant on sight because of his repeated
involvement with her over the previous couple of years. R. 142:7-14. He had
assisted in arresting her for DUI in 2006. R. 142:7. Shortly thereafter, he again
arrested her for DUI and learned by running a computer check that her driver's
license had been revoked until the year 2012. R. 142:8, 10. Subsequently, he
observed her driving twice within a couple of days of each other and issued her two
citations for driving on a revoked license. R. 142:9-12. In the process of printing the
first citation, he again ran a computer check and reaffirmed that her license was still
revoked. R. 142:12. Finally, two or three days prior to his November 8 sighting of
Defendant, Trooper Rawlinson took advantage of an opportunity to check the status
of Defendant's license while at the Driver's License Division, again confirming that
her license remained revoked. R. 142:14-15.
When Defendant drove by the two officers, Trooper Rawlinson pointed her
out to Deputy Stewart, identified her by name, and told him that her license was
3

revoked due to alcohol. R. 142:14,17,23. Relying on the information provided by
Trooper Rawlinson, Deputy Stewart followed Defendant and stopped her.1 R.
142:23-24.
The deputy smelled alcohol on Defendant when he approached the driver's
window. R. 124. He asked if her license was revoked, and Defendant admitted that
it was. Id. Deputy Stewart noticed that Defendant's speech was slow and slurred
and that she had bloodshot, glossy eyes. Id. However, she denied having had any
alcohol. Id. Defendant performed poorly on almost all of the field sobriety tests,
and she refused to take the intoxilizer. R. 124-25. The deputy arrested her and
impounded her car. R. 125. During the subsequent inventory of the car, officers
found an open container of alcohol in Defendant's purse. Id.
Once at the jail, Defendant agreed to the intoxilyzer only after being told that
a warrant for a blood draw could be obtained. Id. She provided an insufficient
breath sample, however, resulting in an incomplete reading that put her breath
volume at .0164 liters and her breath alcohol content at .127. R. 125.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Defendant with driving under the influence ["DUI"], a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West Supp. 2009);
1

The deputy could not remember whether he contacted dispatch to verify the
status of Defendant's license before stopping her. R. 142:26. Regardless, he did not
receive any additional information prior to stopping Defendant. R. 142:26-27.
4

being in actual physical control (with priors), a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502; driving on a suspended or revoked license (alcohol
related), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(3) (a)
(West Supp. 2010); and having an open container in her vehicle, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526(3) (West Supp. 2009). R.
3-5. Following a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over. R. 61-62.
Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress, seeking suppression of
"all evidence in this matter/' and arguing that: (1) the intoxilyzer test was invalid
due to the use of an insufficient sample; (2) the arresting officer lacked reasonable
suspicion for a Level II stop where he failed to corroborate the statements from a
fellow officer before relying on them to stop her; and (3) the open container of
"alcohol" was inadmissible because it was seized without a warrant, the contents
were never tested, and the beverage was not identified. R. 74-75, 76-102. A few
days later, Defendant filed a motion in limine seeking exclusion of all mention of any
prior DUI-related arrest, incarceration, or conviction. R. 109-14.
The State responded to both motions, and both were argued at a motion
hearing on February 16,2010. R. 120-34,135-36. The State presented the testimony
of both Deputy Stewart and Trooper Rawlinson. R. 135. Following argument, the
trial judge granted Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the arresting officer
lacked reasonable suspicion to justify his stop of Defendant. See id.; R. 142:33-37
5

(verbal ruling is attached hereto as Addendum B). At the court's invitation, the
State moved to dismiss the case without prejudice, and the court granted the
motion. R. 135,137-38; R. 142:36-37. The written order was entered on February 16,
2010, and the State timely appealed. R. 137-40.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue I. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal because it arises from a
final appealable pre-trial order from which the State has a statutory right to appeal.
The State is appealing "a pretrial order dismissing a charge on the ground that the
court's suppression of evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case[.]"
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(b) (West Supp. 2009). This statutory provision
supersedes the judicially-imposed requirements set forth in State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d
528 (Utah 1993), which augmented the previous version of section 77-18a-l by
requiring that the dismissal be with prejudice and that the trial court certify that the
suppression of evidence substantially impaired the State's case. See id. at 530-32.
Where the trial court and defense counsel below agreed that the suppression of the
evidence left the State unable to proceed with its case, the order of dismissal was a
final appealable order under the present version of section 77-18a-l(3)(b) even
though it was made without prejudice.
Issue II. The trial court's suppression ruling warrants reversal because it runs
contrary to settled law. The trial judge suppressed the evidence because the
6

arresting officer himself did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the stop.
However, the law provides that when an officer stops a vehicle based on
information he receives from other law enforcement sources, the validity of the stop
rests on whether the source of the information possessed a reasonable suspicion
justifying the stop. Because Trooper Rawlinson had reasonable suspicion to believe
that Defendant was driving on a revoked license, the subsequent stop of the car by
Deputy Stewart pursuant to information he received from Trooper Rawlinson was
justified by reasonable suspicion. Hence, there was no basis upon which to
suppress the evidence found pursuant to that stop, and this Court should reverse
the lower court's contrary decision.
ARGUMENT
L
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL
BECAUSE IT ARISES FROM A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN- § 77-18A-l
Prior to submitting her opening brief, Defendant moved to dismiss this
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. She argued that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l and State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528
(Utah 1993), because the trial court neither certified that suppression of the evidence
"substantially impair[ed] the prosecution's case" nor dismissed the case "with
prejudice[,]" both of which are required by Troyer. Memorandum in Support of

7

Motion [for] Dismissal of Appeal at 2-4 (quoting Troyer, 866 P.2d at 531). Following
receipt of the State's opposing memorandum, this Court denied the motion and
deferred a ruling on the jurisdictional issue "pending plenary presentation and
consideration of the case/' Order dated May 14,2010 (attached in Addendum C).
Jurisdiction rests in this Court because the present statute requires only that
suppression of the evidence "substantially impair[]" the State's case, and both the
court and defense counsel below recognized that suppression of the evidence in this
case prevented the State from proceeding further on the charges. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(b) (WestSupp. 2009).
A, This Court has Jurisdiction Under the Present Statute
Defendant's motion rested on State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). In that
case, the Utah Supreme Court imposed two requirements before the prosecution
could appeal from a dismissal following pretrial suppression of evidence: (1) that
"the trial court certif[y] that the evidence suppressed substantially impairs the
prosecution's case"; and (2) that the State's request for dismissal be "with
prejudice." Id. at 531. On appeal here, Defendant contends that the appeal is
improper because neither Troyer condition was satisfied in this case. Defendant's
reliance on Troyer is misplaced.
When Troyer was decided, section 77-18a-l simply and broadly provided that
"[a]n appeal may be taken by the prosecution from . . . a final judgment of
8

dismissal/' Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1990); Troyer, 866 P.2d at 529.
The statute did not specifically address dismissals pursuant to the State's motion
following a suppression order. Troyer recognized that the State should be able to
appeal from such a dismissal, but felt a need to judicially restrict such appeals by
means of the "certification" and "with prejudice" conditions to prevent a prosecutor
from manipulating the statute to circumvent the interlocutory appeal process.
Troyer, 866 P.2d at 530-31. In short, Troyer created judicially-imposed requirements
that spoke to concerns not addressed by the broadly-worded statute then in
existence.
Since issuance of Troyer, section 77-18a-l has been amended to better define
the circumstances under which the prosecution may appeal as a matter of right The
amendment specifically includes appeals from a dismissal following an order
suppressing evidence:
(3) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from:

(b) a pretrial order dismissing a charge on the ground that the court's
suppression of evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's
case;

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(b) (West Supp. 2009). Thus, under the current statute
governing appeals, the only requirement imposed by the Legislature for appealing a
9

dismissal following a suppression order is that the dismissal be "on the ground that
the court's suppression of evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's
case." Id. The revised statute more directly addresses the situation and concerns
presented in Troyer than did its predecessor, while at the same time rejecting the
need for the additional safeguards of a formal certification and dismissal without
prejudice. Indeed, the statutory requirement of substantial impairment of the State's
case significantly narrows the prosecutor' ability to appeal "'from virtually every
adverse pretrial order'" or pretrial suppression order. See Troyer, 866 P.2d at 530-31
(quoting State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 223, 224 (Utah 1985)); see also State v. Gushing,
2004 UT App 73, \ 13, 88 P.3d 368, cert, granted, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004).2 The
amended statute supersedes Troyer, and its requirement is met in this case.
Here, the trial court did not state in its written order the reason for the
dismissal, nor did the prosecutor identify the grounds upon which the motion to
dismiss was made. R. 137-38. However, a review of the record reveals that the
dismissal was in fact "on the ground that the [trial] court's suppression of evidence.
. . substantially impaired the prosecution's case." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18al(3)(b).

2

Certiorari was granted to direct removal of unnecessary language from the
court of appeals' decision.
10

After stopping Defendant on suspicion of driving on a revoked license, the
sheriffs deputy gathered evidence that Defendant was intoxicated and ultimately
arrested her for DUI. Defendant moved to suppress "all evidence" gathered
following the traffic stop, arguing that the stop was invalid at its inception. R. 74-75.
Defense counsel expressly recognized in arguing for suppression that absent
reasonable suspicion to support the stop, "everything beyond that point is
suppressed, and that leaves the State without a case." R. 142:29 (emphasis added). He
then acknowledged the State's concern for its ability to proceed without the
evidence, stating,"... to argue that this guts their case just is not relevant. It does, but
I guess in a way, that's too bad." Id. (emphasis added). The trial court granted
Defendant's suppression motion, recognizing that it effectively left the State without
evidence to proceed and suggesting that dismissal of the charges was in order for
that reason:
THE COURT: Now, having said that, just housekeeping. I don't
know much about you [Defendant] or about your cases other than
what I've heard in this case here, but it's obvious you have a serious
problem. You are being - [the prosecution] can chose [sic] how they
want to proceed from here but I don't see how they can proceed
without the information from the stop.
I'm begging you, just - you're going to hurt yourself or you're
going to hurt somebody else. (Inaudible).
Mr. McAdams?

11

MR. MCADAMS: At this time the State moves to dismiss
without prejudice, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So with that the court is in recess.
MR. BUNDERSON: And dismissed. The record will show the
case is dismissed?
THE COURT: Yes.
R. 142:33, 36 (emphasis added). The record thus demonstrates that the "pretrial
order dismissing [the] chargefs]" was "on the ground that the court's suppression of
evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 7718a-l(3)(b). Accordingly, the statutory requirement is met, and this Court has
jurisdiction over the State's appeal in this case. See id.
B. Even under Troyer, this Court has Jurisdiction Over this Appeal
Assuming Troyer remains good law, it does not require dismissal of this
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This Court has determined that Troyer "does not
require rigid, mechanical application" of its requirements. Cushing, 2004 UT App
73, Tf 17. It requires only "sufficient indicia" that dismissal was based on substantial
impairment of the State's case. See id. (" jurisdiction is conferred upon an appellate
court pursuant to a final appealable order [of dismissal following a grant of a
pretrial motion to suppress evidence] if it has sufficient indicia of substantial
impairment to the State's case.").
12

"Sufficient indicia" exists in this case where the court and both parties
recognized the devastating effect of the challenged ruling on the State's case.
Further, as the Troyer court explained, certification would give the defendant "a
chance to object before the dismissal is entered while still permitting review by the
appellate court." Troyer, 866 P.2d at 531. Here, Defendant had ample opportunity
to object, failed to do so, and, instead, expressly recognized that the ruling would
"leave[] the State without a case." R. 142:29. Requiring that this obvious fact be
reduced to writing before the State may appeal the ruling would be to elevate form
over substance. See Troyer, 866 P.2d at 531-32 (refusing to remand the case for the
necessary certification because it was "undisputed that the cumulative effect of the
suppression orders left the prosecution unable to proceed."). Where the record is
clear that the suppression of all evidence arising after the traffic stop substantially
impaired the State's case, there is "sufficient indicia of substantial impairment" so as
to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Gushing, 2004 UT App 73, f 17.
Similarly, there is "sufficient indicia" of the State's inability to re-file the
charges to render dismissal with prejudice unnecessary.

Troyer imposed the

requirement of dismissal with prejudice as a "further safeguard" against the refiling
of the charges by the State following affirmance of a suppression decision on appeal.
See Troyer, 866 P.2d at 531. This added protection already exists under the
circumstances at hand, despite the dismissal without prejudice. All of the evidence
13

pertaining to three of the four charges was obtained from the stop. There is nothing
to suggest that any additional evidence exists to support the offenses. Upon
affirmance of the lower court's suppression ruling, the entirety of that evidence will
be unavailable to the State, leaving nothing on which to pursue the charges. Thus,
the purpose served by the additional safeguard of dismissal with prejudice is
essentially served in this case, permitting appellate review. See id. at 528-29,531-32
(permitting appellate review of suppression orders despite fact that dismissal was
not with prejudice).
The fourth charge, driving on a revoked license, is a misdemeanor that cannot
be re-filed in the district court but must be pursued in justice court with the use of
additional evidence establishing that Defendant's license was, in fact, revoked on
November 8, 2008. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-106(l) (West Supp. 2010). Such a
refilling, however, is not the sort of "prosecutorial manipulation'' Troyer sought to
prevent.3 866 P.2d at 531.

3

Assuming, arguendo, that Troyer applies and the ability to refile the
misdemeanor charge prevents appellate review, this Court should dismiss this
appeal for lack of a final appealable order, thereby permitting the State to seek entry
of a new order of dismissal with prejudice from which to file a new appeal. See
Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97,111,37 P.3d 1070 (absent a final appealable order, this
Court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal); Varian-Eimac, Inc. v.
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569,570 (Utah App. 1989) ("When a matter is outside the court's
jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to dismiss the action.").
14

II.
TROOPER RAWLINSON POSSESSED REASONABLE
SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING ON A
SUSPENDED LICENSE, THEREBY JUSTIFYING DEPUTY
STEWART'S STOP OF DEFENDANTS CAR
The lower court granted Defendant's suppression motion because it
determined that the arresting officer, Deputy Stewart, lacked reasonable suspicion
to support the stop. R. 142:33-35. The court determined that the stop was based
solely on Trooper Rawlinson's statement that Defendant's license was suspended,
and held that this statement was "not even close" to establishing reasonable
suspicion to justify the stop because it lacked sufficient detail to explain the basis for
the trooper's belief. R. 142:34-35. The court also determined that reasonable
suspicion could have derived from verification by dispatch that the license was in
fact revoked at that time, but no such verification was given. R. 142:34. Finally, the
court concluded that Stewart himself lacked reasonable suspicion of his own, having
stopped Defendant before he independently observed any driving violation. Id.
This Court should reverse the lower court's suppression ruling because it
rests on an erroneous interpretation of the law. The validity of the stop does not rest
on whether Deputy Stewart had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was driving
on a revoked license, but on whether Trooper Rawlinson, as the 'Taw enforcement
source[]" of the information on which Deputy Stewart relied, possessed reasonable

15

suspicion. See State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,1276-77 (Utah App. 1994). Under the
circumstances at hand, this Court should find that he did.
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit "'all searches and seizures, but
[only] unreasonable searches and seizures/" State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101, Tf 11,
68 R3d 1043 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)) (additional quotations
omitted), cert, denied, 72 R3d 685 (Utah 2003). It is well-established that officers are
permitted to conduct brief investigatory stops where there is "reasonable suspicion
to believe that criminal activity may be afoot." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273 (2002) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Investigatory stops are not
limited to ongoing or prospective crimes, but can also be based on reasonable
suspicion that the suspect "has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity." State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 10,112 P.3d 507 (internal citation and
quotation omitted).
"In order to justify such a detention, the officer's suspicion must be supported
by 'specific and articulable facts and rational inferences.'" Id. (citation omitted). "A
determination that reasonable suspicion exists... need not rule out the possibility of
innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. "This is because the public interest in
investigating criminal activity is sufficiently important to justify the minimal
intrusion into personal security that such investigatory detentions entail." Markland,
2005 UT 26,117 (citing to Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273). Thus, even when all aspects of a
16

defendant's conduct are "susceptible of innocent explanation/' a court still may
properly conclude that the officers had a "particularized and objective basis'7 for
suspecting legal wrongdoing. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78. In assessing whether they
possess reasonable suspicion, officers are allowed to "draw on their own experience
and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained
person." Id. at 273. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
This Court in State v. Case recognized that while an investigating officer's own
observations and inferences generally give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion,
"[a]n investigative stop may survive the Fourth Amendment prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures if performed by an officer who objectively relies
on information, bulletins, or flyers received from other law enforcement sources."
884 P.2d 1274,1276-77 (Utah App. 1994) (first emphasis in original); see also United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,232 (1985); accord State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650-51
(Utah 1989) (stop was justified when made by officers objectively relying on
broadcast issued by other officers possessing reasonable suspicion that the vehicle's
occupants had robbed a store). In such a case, the validity of the stop "does not turn
on whether those relying on the [information] were themselves aware of the specific
facts which led their colleague[] to seek their assistance." Hensley, 469 U.S. at 221.
Instead, the validity of the stop rests on whether the officer "'who issued the
17

[information] possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop/ 7 ' Case, 884 P.2d at
1277 (quoting Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232 (emphasis in original)); see also State v. Roybal,
2010 UT 34, \ 14,232 P.3d 1016; Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30,18,177 P.3d
655, cert denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008). "[T]he legality of a stop based on
information imparted by another will depend on the sufficiency of the articulable
facts known to the individual originating the information... subsequently received
and acted upon by the investigating officer." Case, 884 P.2d at 1277-78 (citing
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232) (emphasis in original) (stop unlawful absent reasonable
suspicion supporting dispatch on which investigating officer relied); State v. Seel,
827 P.2d 954,960 (Utah App. 1992) (officer broadcasting message on which arresting
officer relied in stopping defendants had reasonable suspicion that defendants had
committed multiple burglaries, justifying stop), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992); see also Roybal, 2010 UT 34, f f 20-22 (stop justified where dispatcher
possessed reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while intoxicated,
permitting pursuit and stop by another officer in reliance on dispatch); Bruce, 779
P.2d at 650-51 (police officers justifiably stopped defendant's vehicle in reliance on a
broadcast from investigating officers who possessed reasonable suspicion that
defendant had just robbed a store).
Moreover, the acting officer need not " actually be informed of the facts
known to the originating source" before acting on the information, but "may take
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[the information] at face value and act on it forthwith/7 Case, 884 P.2d at 1277 n.5
(citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231); see also Kaysville v. Mulcahy, III, 943 P.2d 231, 234
(Utah App. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Saddler, 104 P.3d 1265 (Utah
2004). If the legality of the stop is thereafter challenged, "the State becomes
obligated, albeit after the fact, to show that legally sufficient articulable suspicion
prompted issuance" of the original information. Case, 884 P.2d at 1277 n.5; see also
Bench, 2008 UT App 30, \ 8; Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234. This approach acts to
minimize any intrusion on police methods that would hamper prompt investigation
of reported criminal activity "[i]n an era when criminal suspects are increasingly
mobile and increasingly likely to flee across jurisdictional boundaries[.]" Hensley,
469 U.S. at 231.
In this case, Deputy Stewart received information directly from a fellow
officer and relied solely on that information to stop Defendant. That information
included accurately identifying a specific individual by name and by sight,
indicating that she was behind the wheel of a moving car in view of both officers at
the time, and stating that her driver's license was revoked, suggesting that she was
in the process of committing a crime. R. 142:12-14,17,22-24. The lower court held
that this information was "not even close" to being enough to provide Deputy
Stewart with the necessary reasonable suspicion. R. 142:36. Trooper Rawlinson, the
judge noted, needed to provide "further information" concerning the basis for his
19

belief that Defendant's license had been revoked before Deputy Stewart would have
sufficient reasonable suspicion to warrant a stop. R. 142:35.
However, under these circumstances, Deputy Stewart need not himself be
aware of the articulable facts underlying Trooper Rawlinson's information. Because
he was objectively relying on "information ... received from other law enforcement
sources[,]" he was entitled to "take [the information] at face value and act on it
forthwith." Case, 884 P.2d at 1274,1276-77 & n.5 (citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231)
(emphasis added); see also Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231-32. The validity of the stop
thereafter would depend on whether Trooper Rawlinson, who originated the
information upon which Deputy Stewart acted, possessed reasonable suspicion that
Defendant was driving on a suspended license, thereby justifying the stop. See Case
884 P.2d at 1277-78 (citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232); see also Roybal, 2010 UT 34, f 15;.
State v. Van Dyke, 2009 UT App 369, f 22, 223 P.3d 465, cert denied 230 P.3d 127
(Utah 2010); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234-35. This Court should hold that he did.
The lower court implied that Trooper Rawlinson independently possessed
reasonable suspicion when it declared that Deputy Stewart's stop of Defendant
would have been justified if Trooper Rawlinson had provided him with the
information on which he based his belief that Defendant was driving on a revoked
license. R. 142:35. In any event, a review of the totality of the circumstances
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demonstrates that Trooper Rawlinson in fact possessed reasonable suspicion that
Defendant was driving on a revoked license.
Trooper Rawlinson did not rely on what he was told about Defendant, but
had a personal history of relevant interactions with Defendant to justify his belief
that her license had been revoked. Almost two years prior to the present incident,
Trooper Rawlinson had assisted in arresting Defendant for DUI. R. 142:7-8.
"Shortly after that[,]" the trooper arrested her again for DUI. R. 142:8. At the time
of the second arrest, he ran her driver's license number on his computer, resulting in
a screen that displayed Defendant's photograph and the status of her license as
being revoked until 2012. R. 142:10-11.
In the following year, the trooper wrote Defendant two citations for driving
on a revoked license. The first arose when she drove up to the gas pump next to
where the off-duty trooper was filling up his car and proceeded to fill up her own
car before driving off. R. 142:8-9. Trooper Robinson contacted dispatch to report
the matter and to "run her name[,]" and dispatch confirmed that her license was still
revoked. R. 142:12. When he returned to work, he discovered that no one had
followed up on the incident. Id. He went to her house to issue a citation for driving
on a revoked license and, while he was waiting at the front door, she drove up in
her car, earning a second citation for the same offense. Id.
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Consequently, in the two years prior to the instant offense, Trooper
Rawlinson had no less than five encounters with Defendant relating to driving
while intoxicated or with a revoked license. In the course of those encounters, he
verified the revoked status of her driver's license at least twice through means
regularly relied upon by police officers.
Finally, just days preceding the instant matter, the trooper again checked
Defendant's licensing status, this time on one of the computers at the Driver's
License Division, and reconfirmed that her license was revoked. R. 142:14-15. It
was with this background and knowledge that Trooper Rawlinson advised Deputy
Stewart in early November 2008 that the person behind the wheel of a car driving
past them was Patricia Houston and that her license had been revoked because of
alcohol. R. 142:7-14. Such personal experience and observations were more than
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 237 ("'An
informant who has personally observed incriminating behavior has a stronger basis
of knowledge than does an informant who relates not what he knows personally,
but what he has heard others say/") (quoting State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 665
A.2d 338, 340 (1995) (citation omitted)).
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Gibson is dispositive. See State
v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302,1304-05 (Utah 1983). In that case, a trooper arrested Gibson
for DUI, resulting in revocation of Gibson's license. See id. Almost nine months
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after the arrest, and nearly four months after last checking to see that the license was
revoked, the trooper saw Gibson drive by him as the trooper was talking to a fellow
officer. See id. at 1303. The trooper stopped Gibson because he suspected that the
license was still revoked. Id. Gibson confirmed as much when he was stopped, and
the trooper arrested him. Id. Gibson ultimately moved to suppress all the evidence
obtained as a result of his arrest, arguing that the trooper lacked an objective basis
on which to stop him. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the
suppression motion, holding that the arresting trooper's prior personal contact with
Gibson amounted to articulable and reasonable suspicion that Gibson was driving
on a revoked license. See id. at 104-05.
Here, the lower court voiced concern for the possibility that " something"
might have occurred to cause an early reinstatement of Defendant's license. R.
142:34. However, Trooper Rawlinson had discovered that the revocation was to last
until 2012 and repeatedly confirmed that the license was still revoked. R. 142:7-8,
10-12,14-15. Trooper Rawlinson also verified the continued revocation a mere days
prior to the instant offense. R. 142:14-15. It would be reasonable for the trooper to
infer that Defendant's second DUI arrest and her two subsequent driving-related
citations had done nothing to shorten the revocation period, but had likely
prolonged it. Hence, the trooper's extended personal experience with Defendant
and his repeated checks on her license with consistent outcomes provided him with
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reasonable suspicion that Defendant was driving on a revoked license. See Gibson,
665 P.2d at 1304-05. Indeed, Trooper Rawlinson's experience with Defendant was
much more extensive than was the officer experience with Gibson. Moreover, the
officer in Gibson stopped the driver based on revocation information obtained four
months earlier. See id. at 1303. In this case, Defendant was stopped just days after
Trooper Rawlinson reconfirmed that her license was revoked.

R. 142:14-15.

Accordingly, Deputy Stewart was entitled to rely on Trooper Rawlinson's
information to stop Defendant, and Defendant's suppression motion should have
been denied. See id, (finding reasonable suspicion from officer's prior encounters
with defendant); see also Roybal, 2010 UT 34, f If 23-24 (upholding DUI stop made in
reliance on information from dispatch where dispatcher had reasonable suspicion of
DUI based on call from defendant's girlfriend).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reinstate the charges and reverse
the suppression of the State's evidence arising from the stop of Defendant.
Respectfully submitted October 7, 2010.
MARKL. SH^RTLEFF.
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ADDENDUM A
U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMEND. IV
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18A-1 (WEST SUPftlfWJ

U.S. Const. Amend. IV
A m e n d m e n t IV.

Search and seizure

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (West Supp. 2009)
§ 7 7 - 1 8 a - l . Appeals—When proper
(1) A defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the defendant;
(c) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending
prosecution; or
(d) an order d e l i n g bail, as provided in Subsection 77-20-1(7).
(2) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (1), a defendant may seek discretionary appellate review of any interlocutory order.
(3) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a
refusal to bind the defendant over for trial;
(b) a pretrial order dismissing a charge on the ground that the court's suppression of
evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case;
(c) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest:
(d) an order arresting judgment or granting a motion for merger;
(e) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or
denial of a speedy trial;
(f) an order granting a new trial;
(g) an order holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(h) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending
prosecution;
(i) an order finding, pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 19, Part 2, Competency for Execution,
that an inmate sentenced to death is incompetent to be executed;
(j) an order reducing the degree of offense pursuant to Section 76-3-402; or
(k) an illegal sentence.
(4) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (3), the prosecution may seek
discretionary appellate review of any interlocutory order entered before jeopardy attaches.
Laws 1990, c. 7, § 10; Laws 1995, c 65, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 364, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997;
Laws 2003, c. 11, § 10, eff. March 15, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 137, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 106,
§ 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2006, c. 93, § 1, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2009, c. 175, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009.
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1

- police to police-

So clearly, that's the information -

2

that's the flyer that was given, and Rovbal says that,

3

"Officers can rely on other sources of information, including

4

bulletins or flyers received from other law enforcement."

5

That's exactly what we have here.

6

issued the flyer or bulletin possess reasonable suspicion to

7

justify the stop."

8

had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop.

9

that he had probable cause, if not actual knowledge that she

"So long as the police who

And with Trooper Rawlinson, obviously he
I would submit

10

was driving on a suspended license because of his previous

11

interactions with Ms. Houston.

12

Deputy Stewart - and I'm not saying that that was

13

communicated to Deputy Stewart, but that didn't need to be

14

communicated to Deputy Stewart according the Case law.

15

was communicated is that it was Patricia Houston; that her

16

license was revoked, and that she was alcohol restricted.

17

Based upon that information Deputy Stewart's suspicion was

18

reasonable.

19

What

I don't have any further argument.

THE COURT: All right.

On the defendant's motion to

20

suppress based on the allegation there's no reasonable

21

suspicion for the arresting officer, Deputy Stewart, to have

22 I pulled over Ms. Houston in the first place, I'm granting that
23

motion to suppress. There was no reasonable suspicion held by

24

Deputy Stewart, the arresting officer, at the time he pulled

25

Ms. Houston over.
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1

I agree with the State that the information from

2

the highway patrolman is not the same as a citizen because

3

certainly he has more knowledge and information than a

4

citizen, but this is the very reason why we have these rules.

5

We can't have officers just telling people - telling other

6

officers to pull other people over because they think they

7

have something.

8

It may be that her license was reinstated.

9

lot of things that could have happened. These rules prevent

It may be that there was a computer glitch.
Then there's a

10

that kind of abuse.

11

here or that that was the intent at all.

12

trying to do their job, but simply you have to have

13

something.

14

Now, I'm not saying that there was abuse
These officers are

Let me take a minute just to help the officers, at

15

least in my perspective, understand.

Deputy Stewart should

16

have called into dispatch.

17

this.

18

didn't talk about it here today.

19

confirmation from dispatch that a license was revoked and

20

that this person was doing it, that - we wouldn't be here.

That would have solved all of

I don't - there's some evidence that he did and he
But if he would have had

21 | This wouldn't be an issue.
22

So follow her around, follow her to her house,

23

whatever he had to do until you get that confirmation or

24

until you see a driving violation, then you have reasonable

25

suspicion to pull them over. But until then, just another
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1

officer saying, "Hey, go pull her over. She's driving on a

2

suspended license," that just doesn't rise to the level.

3

Now, if you had received further information from

4

Trooper Rawlinson such as I was down at the Driver's License

5

Division a few days ago and I looked at the computer screen

6

and I saw all this stuff, if he articulated that to you then

7

that certainly rises to the level.

8

I know this is difficult to understand sometimes,

9

we litigate about this stuff all the time, so it's no clear

10

bright line rule and it's difficult for you guys as your

11

sitting out there making quick decisions as to how to do it.

12

But in this particular case, there just was no reasonable

13

suspicion to pull her over.

14

Let me give you another example.

Lots of times a

15

CI will come to other cops and say, "Hey, listen, I was at

16

this party the other night, they were smoking pot.'7

17

is a reliable CI. I see these in search warrants all the

18

time. Those officers will still go and do something to verify

19

that information. They'll go and pull the trash and they'll

20

verify that those people live there.

21

discarded, you know, baggies of marijuana, whatever ir is.

And this

They'll look for

22 I They'll do something. Or they'll sit and watch the house and
23

see if there's a lot of activity coming to the house.

24

Something to verify what the CI has told them before they get

25

on the [inaudible] and get a warrant.
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1
2

I know that a stop is different than a PC but the
principles are the same.

You're trying to find something

3 I where you come in here and articulate, if you have something
4

like this.

Lots of times it's best just to think, Well,

5

okay, if there's a defense attorney out there that's going t

6

try to get me on this - and I don't mean get you - but call

7

me on this and make sure it's right, what am I going to say

8

in court? How am I going to articulate what I saw; what I

9

witnesses; what I was able to come back here in court and

10

tell the judge, this is why I -pulled them over?

11

statement, she has a revoked license and you wanted to stop

12

her is not even close to that level.

13

have to have more than just a statement.

14

more than that.

15

And a short

Essentially the - you
You have to have

Now, having said that, just housekeeping. I don't

16

know much about you or about your cases other than what I've

17

heard in this case here, but it's obvious you have a serious

18

problem.

19

proceed from here but I don't see how they can proceed

20

without the information from the stop.

21
22

You are being - they can chose how they want to

I'm begging you, just - you're going to hurt
yourself or you're going to hurt somebody else. (Inaudible).

23

Mr. McAdams?

24

MR. MCADAMS: At this time the State moves to

25

dismiss without prejudice, Your Honor.

1
2
3 I
4

THE COURT: All right.

So with that the court is in

recess.
MR. BUNDERSON: And dismissed. The record will show
the case is dismissed?

5

THE COURT: Yes.

6

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo—

State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 20100246-CA
v.
Patricia Salazar Houston.,
Defendant and Appellee,

This matter is before the court on Appellee Patricia
Houston's motion for summary disposition based on lack of
jurisdiction. Houston argues that the appeal should be dismissed
because the dismissal order was not with prejudice and it did not'
state the ground for dismissal. The State argues that the
current statute superceded the requirements argued by Houston.
Because it appears that the issue presented is a matter of first
impression, it is not amenable to summary disposition. The
parties should anticipate briefing this issue more completely on
full briefing.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Houston's motion for summary
disposition is denied, and a ruling on the issues raised therein
is deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration of the
case.
Dated this
FOR THE COURT:

ih

JM

day of May, 2 010

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 14, 2 010, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to:
JEFFREY S. GRAY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
ELIZABETH HUNT
ATTORNEY AT LAW
569 BROWNING AVE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105
Dated this May 14, 2010.
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